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for purposes of Fourth Amendment protection. 2553 Therefore,
evidence procured when one does not yield to physical force or a
show of authority cannot be considered "fruit of a seizure,"
2554
because no seizure exists.
Accordingly, in the case at hand, both New York and Federal
law would permit the vials of cocaine found by the police officers
to be admitted as evidence, without violating defendant's
constitutional rights.
People v. May 2555
(decided December 16, 1992)

Defendant appealed the trial court's denial of his motion to
suppress evidence which he claimed was "the fruitfl of an illegal
stop and seizure[,]"

2556

taken in violation of his state 2557 and

federal 2558

constitutional rights. The appellate division affirmed
the trial court's decision. 2559 The New York Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that the police did not have a reasonable
suspicion that criminal activity existed, therefore the evidence
obtained from the unconstitutional search should have been
suppressed.

2560

In May, defendant was parked with a companion on a deserted
street early in the morning in an area known for its high crime
activity. 256 1 As two police officers, who were patrolling the area,
approached the car with their "red turret lights and spotlight on,
2553.
2554.
2555.
2556.

Id.
Id. at 629.
81 N.Y.2d 725, 609 N.E.2d 113, 593 N.Y.S.2d 760 (1992).
Id. at 727, 609 N.E.2d at 114, 593 N.Y.S.2d 761.

2557. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. ("The right of people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated.., but upon probable cause .... ").
2558. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. ("The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated. .. ").
2559. People v. May, 176 A.D.2d 484, 484, 574 N.Y.S.2d 958, 958 (1st
Dep't 1991).
2560. May, 81 N.Y.2d at 728, 609 N.E.2d at 115, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 762.

2561. Id. at 727, 609 N.E.2d at 114, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 761.
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defendant started the engine of the [car] and slowly pulled
away." 2562 When the officers demanded that defendant stop the
vehicle, he complied and was asked to produce his driver's
license and registration. 2563 While the officers waited for the
documents, "they noticed that a towel was draped over the
steering wheel column. " 2564 After calling in the license plate
number of the vehicle, the officers were informed that the car
was stolen and the defendant was placed under arrest. 2565 The
police officers subsequently searched the defendant and his car,
finding vials of crack on his person, and a broken steering
column hidden under the towel. 25 66 At trial, defendant
unsuccessfully moved to suppress the evidence found by the
2567
police during this search.
The court of appeals held "that when the police, using red
turret lights, a spotlight and a loudspeaker, ordered defendant to
pull the car over, defendant was effectively 'seized'" within the
meaning of the Constitution. 25 68 However, the court reasoned
that the act of slowly moving the car away from the police did
not create the requisite reasonable suspicion necessary to seize
defendant, 25 69 and thus, the police "had no legal basis to stop the
car when they did."2570 In short, the police officers needed a
"reasonable suspicion of criminal activity" in order to validate
the seizure at hand. 257 1 An alternative suggested by the court,
which would have effectuated a lawful seizure, would have been
for the police to have followed the car while checking on the
257 2
license plate to ascertain whether the car had been stolen.

2562. Id.
2563. Id.
2564. Id.

2565.
2566.
2567.
2568.
2569.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 728, 609 N.E.2d at 115, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 762.

2570. Id.
2571. Id.
2572. Id.

https://digitalcommons.tourolaw.edu/lawreview/vol10/iss3/82

2

et al.: Search and Seizure

1234

TOURO LAW REVIEW

[Vol 10

To determine what constitutes "reasonable suspicion" the court
examined the rule stated in People v. Sobotker2573 and People v.
De Bour.2 5 7 4 In essence, the police officer's "knowledge
possessed at that moment and any reasonable inferences" are to
be examined to determine if reasonable suspicion exists. 2575
The De Bour court articulated standard which set forth four
levels of permissible police intrusion to determine whether a
seizure is valid. First, the court of appeals stated that "[t]he
minimal intrusion of approaching to request information is
permissible when there is some objective credible reason for that
interference not necessarily indicative of criminality."2576 The
second level of police intrusion is the common-law right to

2573. 43 N.Y.2d 559, 373 N.E.2d 1218, 402 N.Y.S.2d 993 (1978). In
Sobotker, the court found no reasonable suspicion existed when police stopped
defendants' car after the occupants had slowed down and glanced at a bar
while driving in a high-crime neighborhood. Id. at 562-63, 373 N.E.2d at
1219, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 995. The court of appeals stated that:
Except for routine checks to enforce automobile regulations ...

our

repeated decisions make abundantly clear that, absent at least a
reasonable suspicion that its occupants had been, are then, or are about
to be, engaged in conduct in violation of law, the stopping of an
automobile by the police constitutes an impermissible seizure.
Id. at 563, 373 N.E.2d at 1220, 402 N.Y.S.2d at 996; see also People v.
Ingle, 36 N.Y.2d 413, 330 N.E.2d 39, 369 N.Y.S.2d 67 (1975). The Ingle
court noted that:
A single automobile traveling on a public highway may be stopped for a
'routine traffic check' when a police officer reasonably suspects a
violation of the Vehicle and Traffic Law. Absent reasonable suspicion
of a vehicle violation, a 'routine traffic check' to determine whether or
not a vehicle is being operated in compliance with the Vehicle and
Traffic Law is permissible only when conducted according to
nonarbitrary, nondiscriminatory, uniform procedures for detecting
violations. It should be emphasized that, in the context of a motor
vehicle inspection 'stop', the degree of suspicion required to justify the
stop is minimal. Nothing like probable cause as that term is used in the
criminal law is required.
Id. at 414-15, 330 N.E.2d at 40, 369 N.Y.S.2d at 69.
2574. 40 N.Y.2d 210, 352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375.
2575. Id. at 216, 352 N.E.2d at 567, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
2576. Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 571-72, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 384.
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inquire. 2577 This level of intrusion gives the police officer the
right to question a citizen, but does not rise to the level of a
seizure. 2578 The third level of police intrusion is valid "[w]here a

police officer entertains a reasonable suspicion that a particular
person has committed, is committing or is about to commit a
felony or misdemeanor. .

. . "2579

In such a situation, a police

officer has the authority to stop and frisk an individual.2580
"Finally a police officer may arrest and take into custody a

2577. Id. at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
2578. Id.
2579. Id.; see also N.Y. CRM. PROC. LAW § 140.50 (McKinney 1992).

This section provides that:
1. In addition to the authority provided by this article for making an
arrest without a warrant, a police officer may stop a person in a
public place located within the geographical area of such officer's
employment when he reasonably suspects that such person is
committing, has committed or is about to commit either (a) a
felony or (b) a misdemeanor defined in the penal law, and may
demand of him his name, address and an explanation of his
conduct.
2. Any person who is a peace officer and who provides security
services for any court of the unified court system may stop a
person in or about the courthouse to which he is assigned when he
reasonably suspects that such person is committing, has committed
or is about to commit either (a) a felony or (b) a misdemeanor
defined in the penal law, and may demand of him his name,
address and an explanation of his conduct.
3. When upon stopping a person under circumstances prescribed in
subdivisions one and two a police officer or court officer, as the
case may be, reasonably suspects that he is in danger of physical
injury, he may search such person for a deadly weapon or any
instrument, article or substance readily capable of causing serious
physical injury and of a sort not ordinarily carried in public places
by law-abiding persons. If he finds such a weapon or instrument,
or any other property possession of which he reasonably believes
may constitute the commission of a crime, he may take it and keep
it until the completion of the questioning, at which time he shall
either return it, if lawfully possessed, or arrest such person.
Id.

2580. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385.
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person when he has probable cause to believe that person has
258 1
committed a crime, or offense in his presence.
Based on the facts in May, the court found that the police
officers "knew only that defendant and another person were
sitting in a car parked on a desolate street, a fact which provided
them with no information regarding criminality." '2 582 The court
further found defendant's pulling away from the curb did not
create a "reasonable suspicion of criminal activity." 2583

2581. Id.; see also N.Y. CRMI. PROC. LAW § 140.10 (McKinney 1992).
Section 140.10 states that:
1. Subject to the provisions of subdivision two, a police officer may
arrest a person for:
(a) Any offense when he has reasonable cause to believe that
such person has committed such offense in his presence; and
(b) A crime when he has reasonable cause to believe that such
person has committed such crime, whether in his presence or
otherwise.
2. A police officer may arrest a person for a petty offense, pursuant
to subdivision one, only when:
(a) Such offense was committed or believed by him to have been
committed within the geographical area of such police
officer's employment; and
(b) Such arrest is made in the county in which such offense was
committed or believed to have been committed or in an
adjoining county; except that the police officer may follow
such person in continuous close pursuit, commencing either
in the county in which the offense was or is believed to have
been committed or in an adjoining county, in and through
any county of the state, and may arrest him in any county in
which he apprehends him.
3. A police officer may arrest a person for a crime, pursuant to
subdivision one, whether or not such crime was committed within
the geographical area of such police officer's employment, and he
may make such arrest within the state, regardless of the situs of
the commission of the crime. In addition, he may, if necessary,
pursue such person outside the state and may arrest him in any
state the laws of which contain provisions equivalent to those of
section 140.55.
Id.
2582. May, 81 N.Y.2d at 727-28, 609 N.E.2d at 115, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
2583. Id. at 728, 609 N.E.2d at 115, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 762.
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The court concluded its opinion by stating that its holding
should not be construed such that a police officer "may not make
a common-law inquiry of those in a vehicle based upon a founded
suspicion .... "2584 However,
[t]he police may not forcibly detain civilians in order to question
them... without a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and
once defendant indicated, by pulling away from the curb, that he
did not wish to speak with the officers, they should not have
forced him to stop without legal grounds to do so. 2 585
The reasoning behind this limitation, according to the court, lay
in the belief that "[a]ny other rule would permit seizures solely if
25 86
circumstances existed presenting a potential for danger."
In dissent, Judge Bellacosa stated that:
[t]he officers did nothing unlawful, unreasonable, uncalled for or
unconstitutional. The police should have the right to reasonably,
peacefully and safely secure a potentially very dangerous

situation like this while they do their jobs. The circumstances
here were certainly suspicious and the police were attempting to
25 87
conduct a concededly permissible standard motorist inquiry.
Judge Bellacosa based his dissent on the fact that the issue in May
was not an inquiry under the third level of the De Bour
model. 2588 Rather, he asserted that the inquiry should be
analyzed from the perspective of the second tier, "common-law
right of inquiry in an analogous police-civilian street encounter
involving a vehicle."2589 As noted in De Bour, this inquiry is
"activated by a founded suspicion that criminal activity is afoot
and permits a somewhat greater intrusion in that a police [officer]
is entitled to interfere with a citizen to the extent necessary to
gain explanatory information, but short of a forcible
2584.
2585.
2586.
2587.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 730, 609 N.E.2d at 116, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 763 (Bellacosa, J.,

dissenting) (citation omitted).
2588. Id. at 728, 609 N.E.2d at 115, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 762 (Bellacosa, J.,

dissenting).
2589. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
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seizure." 2590 The dissent agreed that the officers had the
requisite "founded suspicion that criminal activity might be afoot
and, therefore, only the common-law right of inquiry was
activated." 259 1 However, the order by the police officers for
defendant "'to pull over' and the brief, ordinary inquiry
addressed to the motorist was 'short of a forcible seizure' under
our pertinent precedents for the purposes of the issue to be
decided in this case." 2592 Thus, the dissent found that no seizure
had occurred which would justify the suppression of
evidence. 2593
The United States Supreme Court has articulated the definition
of a seizure in Terry v. Ohio.2594 According to Terry, a person is
seized within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment "whenever a
police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk

away . .

"2595

The

Court

noted,

however,

that

"[o]bviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and
citizens involves 'seizures' of persons. Only when the officer, by
means of physical force or show of authority, has in some way
restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
'seizure' has occurred." ' 2596 Thus, according to the United States
Supreme Court, a seizure has been effectuated when an officer,
by actual force or a display of authority, has restrained an
individual's liberty. 2597
2590. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d at 223, 352 N.E.2d at 572, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 385.

2591. May, 81 N.Y.2d at 729, 609 N.E.2d at 116, 593 N.Y.S.2d at 763
(Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
2592. Id. Judge Bellacosa further stated that:

The conduct of the officers, among the range of options available in the
given circumstances, did not violate the "overriding requirement of
reasonableness." Moreover, reversal in this case may engender new
confusion and squeeze the commonsense meaning out of the common-

law right to inquire where the individual to be inquired of happens to be
in a vehicle.
Id.
2593. Id. (Bellacosa, J., dissenting).
2594. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
2595. Id. at 16.

2596. Id. at 19 n.16.
2597. Id. at 16.
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The Terry Court utilized an objective standard to determine the
constitutionality of a police officer's actions. Thus, the necessary
question is: "[WJould the facts available to the officer at the
moment of the seizure ... 'warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that the action taken was appropriate?" 25 98 To
answer this question, the Terry Court put forth a dual test to
determine wiether a seizure is reasonable or not. It stated that
one must first determine whether the police officer's action was
justified at its undertaking, and second, whether the seizure was
"reasonably related in scope to the circumstances which justified
the interference in the first place." 2599
Under this federal analysis, it would be up to interpretation as
to whether Terry would authorize the seizure of the defendant in
May. While the police obviously used some show of authority by
utilizing their turret lights and loudspeaker, the question of
reasonableness of the seizure remains unanswered. In short,
under both the State and Federal Constitutions, the key to the
validity of a seizure is the circumstances surrounding the
encounter.
SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE DIVISION
FIRST DEPARTMENT
People v. Bora2600
(decided March 13, 1993)
Defendant alleged that his State2601 and Federal 2602
Constitutional right to remain free from unreasonable
2598. Id. at 21-22. The Court noted that "[a]nything less would invite
intrusions upon constitutionally guaranteed rights based on nothing more
substantial than inarticulate hunches, a result this Court has consistently
refused to sanction." Id. at 22.
2599. Id. at 19-20.
2600. 191 A.D.2d 384, 595 N.Y.S.2d 437 (1st Dep't), leave to appeal
grantedby, 81 N.Y.2d 1070, 619 N.E.2d 667, 601 N.Y.S.2d 589 (1993).
2601. N.Y. CONST. art. I, §12. Article I, § 12 provides in pertinent part:
"The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
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